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ABSTRACT The lack of reliable sources of detailed information on the vulnerabilities of open-source software (OSS) components
is a major obstacle to maintaining a secure software supply chain and an effective vulnerability management process. Standard
sources of advisories and vulnerability data, such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), are known to suffer from
poor coverage and inconsistent quality.
To reduce our dependency on these sources, we propose an approach that uses machine-learning to analyze source code
repositories and to automatically identify commits that are security-relevant (i.e., that are likely to fix a vulnerability). We treat
the source code changes introduced by commits as documents written in natural language, classifying them using standard
document classification methods.
Combining independent classifiers that use information from different facets of commits, our method can yield high precision
(80%) while ensuring acceptable recall (43%). In particular, the use of information extracted from the source code changes
yields a substantial improvement over the best known approach in state of the art, while requiring a significantly smaller
amount of training data and employing a simpler architecture.
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Abstract—The lack of reliable sources of detailed information
on the vulnerabilities of open-source software (OSS) components
is a major obstacle to maintaining a secure software supply chain
and an effective vulnerability management process. Standard
sources of advisories and vulnerability data, such as the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD), are known to suffer from poor
coverage and inconsistent quality.
To reduce our dependency on these sources, we propose an
approach that uses machine-learning to analyze source code
repositories and to automatically identify commits that are
security-relevant (i.e., that are likely to fix a vulnerability).
We treat the source code changes introduced by commits as
documents written in natural language, classifying them using
standard document classification methods.
Combining independent classifiers that use information from
different facets of commits, our method can yield high precision
(80%) while ensuring acceptable recall (43%). In particular, the
use of information extracted from the source code changes yields a
substantial improvement over the best known approach in state of
the art, while requiring a significantly smaller amount of training
data and employing a simpler architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
The software industry is facing the difficult challenge of
reconciling the opportunity represented by the availability of
mature, high-quality open-source software (OSS) components,
with the problem of maintaining a secure OSS supply chain
and an effective vulnerability management process. The lack
of comprehensive, consistent, and up-to-date sources of vul-
nerability data represents a fundamental obstacle to tackle this
challenge.
The current de-facto standard source of vulnerability data,
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)1, is known to suf-
fer from poor coverage: according to a recent study, as many
as 25% of the OSS projects silently fix vulnerabilities without
ever disclosing them in an official advisory [1]. The same
study reports that only 10% of the OSS vulnerabilities receive
a CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) identifier and
are published on the NVD. Silent fixes make it hard (if at all
possible) for the clients of the affected OSS component to
assess the urgency of upgrading to a newly released version,
because upgrades that only bring new features or functional
improvements are made indistinguishable from those that
(also) correct security flaws.
Furthermore, even the vulnerability advisories (CVEs), that
will eventually be posted in the NVD, follow a process that
has a somewhat unpredictable timing. In practice, the interval
between the moment a vulnerability of an OSS component
1https://nvd.nist.gov/
becomes known to the public (e.g., because a commit fixing it
is pushed to the source code repository of the project) and
the actual availability of a new release that includes that
fix, can last a few days or even weeks (sometimes months).
During such time-frame, a malicious party that would examine
the code commits in an open-source project, could infer the
existence of a security issue and exploit it before a fixed
release is available through standard distribution channels.
This risk is pushing the industry towards monitoring source
code repositories in real-time and automatically, to detect new
security-relevant changes in a timely manner, without the need
of waiting for official advisories to be published.
Manually linking a vulnerability and the commit(s) that fix it
requires considerable manual effort and expert knowledge, and
is therefore expensive and error-prone. This problem motivated
research on automated methods that could alleviate the cost of
this activity and of vulnerability analysis in general [2], [3].
In this paper we present a novel approach to the automated
identification of source code changes that are security-relevant.
Our approach relies only on data available in code repositories,
i.e., source code commits and their log messages, without
the need of accessing vulnerability advisories. It allows a
timely identification of security fixes, providing the necessary
details to support a precise assessment of the impact of a OSS
vulnerability using tools such as the one proposed by Ponta et
al. [4]. To do so, inspired by the naturalness hypothesis [5],
[6], we treat source code changes as documents written in nat-
ural language and we classify them using standard document
classification methods.
We show that using information extracted directly from the
source code, and combining independent classifiers suitably
tuned, our method can yield high precision (80%) while
ensuring a relatively good recall (43%). This result represents a
substantial improvement over the best known approach in state
of the art [3], while requiring a significantly smaller amount
of training data and using a simpler architecture.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
positions our contribution with respect to the existing litera-
ture. Sec.III presents our approach to commit classification,
whose quantitative evaluation is presented in Sec. IV. In
Sec. V we elaborate on some important aspects of commit
classification in practice. Finally, Sec. VI concludes the paper
outlining the research directions we intend to pursue in the
future.
II. RELATED WORK
The research on applying machine learning to source code
analysis has been very active in recent years. Recent surveys
of the field can be found in [7] and in [5], where the emphasis
is on approaches that, like ours does, rely on the naturalness
of software [6].
Concerning the concrete problem of commit classification,
the closest work to ours is [3], which presents an approach
that uses an ensemble of six different models whose output
is combined with an additional logistic regression model.
Differently from us, the method of [3] classifies a commit
based only on its log message, whereas we also consider
information extracted from the source code changes that it
introduces. Their architecture is more complex than ours, and
uses more sophisticated word representation method (word
embeddings, instead of plain bag of words). The training in [3]
was done on a dataset of over 12400 commits (whereas we
only used 2715). A comparison of their experimental results
with ours is presented in Sec. IV. The classification of bug
tracking tickets, also addressed in [3] is out of the scope of
our work.
Vulnerability datasets like the one we used are a precious
(and scarce) resource. Perl et al. [2], as part of their work
on finding Vulnerability Contributing Commits (VCC), have
produced what they claim to be the largest (public) database
of mappings between CVEs affecting OSS and the commits
that introduced the vulnerability. Their methodology, although
automated, only considers CVEs that include an explicit refer-
ence to the corresponding commit(s); in our experience, these
references are rather rare and often inaccurate. The dataset
of [2] includes 640 commits, corresponding to 718 CVEs,
affecting 66 C/C++ projects.
Commercial vendors such as SourceClear
(http://sourceclear.com) and Snyk (http://snyk.io/vuln)
provide vulnerability data through their Web pages; Snyk
also publishes monthly dumps of their databases on GitHub.
These resources could be used to replicate our study.
III. COMMIT CLASSIFICATION
Our approach to commit classification revolves around the
following two key ideas.
First, we use conventional machine-learning algorithms and
natural language processing (NLP) methods. Differently from
other works (such as [3]) that concentrate on classifying
commits based solely on the commit log message, we propose
a novel way to treat the lines of code modified by a commit
(in the following referred to as the patch) as a text document
containing terms from the natural language. To do so, we
extract the terms that the developer used to name entities in
the source code (e.g., names of classes, functions, parameters,
variables, constants etc.): the result is a document to which
standard NLP methods can be applied.
Second, we are guided by the practical need, observed in
our day-to-day work in the security department at [COMPANY
NAME], of ensuring high precision, and avoid wasting precious
resources to deal with false-positives. To achieve this goal,
we construct and train two different independent models, each
considering a different aspect of the commit (the log message
and the patch, respectively), tuning each of them for high-
precision. We experimented with different models (logistic
regression, random forests, support vector machines, among
others), and with different combinations of parameter settings
(e.g., different kernels and regularization methods, and other
model-specific parameters). Due to space constraints, we omit
here a discussion of the performance obtained with each
combination. We observed that SVM performs consistently
better than the other methods in our tests, and in particular, we
found that a linear kernel and L2 regularization provided both
good predictive performance and acceptable training time. We
do not claim this is a general result, but we did observe that the
impact of the choice of the model seems to have a lesser effect
on predictive performance compared to the impact produced
by different choices of feature sources and data pre-processing
strategies.
When used separately, each of such models yields a rela-
tively low recall. To compensate for this effect, we combine
the two models in a joint model, implementing a simple voting
mechanism that flags a commit as security-relevant as soon as
at least one of the two models reports it as security-relevant.
Because each model is trained on different facets of commits,
their predictions are practically independent, and therefore the
likelihood that the joint model produces a false negative is
reduced, thus increasing recall.
In the following we describe the two models (msg and patch)
that are combined in the joint model.
A) Log Message Classifier (msg). Using the well-known bag
of words approach, after some pre-filtering (stopword removal,
normalization, removal of special characters, stemming) we
transformed each log message into a vector of word counts
and we trained a linear SVM model.
While this is a well-understood, basic document classifica-
tion exercise, it comes with its own challenges. First, log mes-
sages can be rather short, and thus contain little information
for the classifier to exploit. Second, by examining manually
hundreds of security fixes, we observed that, depending on the
community and on the specific project at hand, security fixes
can be quite difficult to distinguish (even for a human expert)
based only on the commit message.
Ideally, one would expect that the log message should
clearly indicate whether the commit at hand is meant to
correct a security flaw. However, in practice, we observed
that many projects avoid explicit log messages when pushing
security fixes, possibly because that would make it easier for
an attacker to infer what the vulnerability is, and to exploit it
while a release embedding the fix is not ready yet.
B) Patch Classifier (patch). Along the lines of [6], this
approach stems from the intuition that the choice of identifier
names in source code (that is the terms that the developer uses
to name classes, methods, variables) is an essential means to
convey semantics and thus can convey information that can be
used for classification.
Based on this intuition, we treat the source code changes
themselves as a plain text document, and we reduce the prob-
lem of classifying code changes to the problem of classifying a
document containing natural language terms. Once reduced to
such a document, code changes can be represented as bags of
words and be treated with standard text-classification methods
(similar to the log message classifier, except for a different
preprocessing phase (see next section).
IV. EVALUATION
A. Dataset
For our studies we used a labeled dataset of known open-
source vulnerabilities constructed while operating an open-
source vulnerability scanner, described in [4], developed and
adopted at SAP for internal use. Differently from [2], who
collected commits that introduce vulnerabilities, our dataset
contains commits that implement fixes to vulnerabilities. Its
data covers 220 open-source Java projects that are used in
SAP software (either products or internal tools) and contains
around 1100 security-relevant commits corresponding to the
fixes for 540 vulnerabilities (e.g., CVEs). For our study we
used a subset of 660 such commits from 152 repositories.
The data preparation phase includes several ad-hoc steps
of little technical interest, but whose impact on the classi-
fication results is significant: we summarize here the main
ones in the hope of encouraging studies that replicate (and
possibly improve) our results. After skipping invalid commits,
we removed duplicates (commits with different identifier but
identical content), obtaining 456 unique commits, assigned to
the positive (pos) class.
We then augmented the dataset with instances of the “neg-
ative” class (non-security-relevant): for each positive instance
p from repository R, we took k random commits n1, . . . , nk
from R and, under the assumption that security-relevant com-
mits are rare compared to other types of commits, we treated
these as “negative” examples. To check the validity of this
assumption, and to avoid including obvious outliers (extremely
large, empty, or otherwise invalid commits), we performed
a manual review of these commits, with the help of ad-hoc
scripts and pattern matching (similarly to [3]). We chose k = 5
to get approximately (1+5)× 456 commits overall. After the
manual review, we obtained a dataset of 2715 instances (456
of the positive class, and 2259 of the negative class).
This raw dataset was further processed to remove stop-
words, filter non-alphanumeric characters and normalize the
text data. In particular, for the patch data, we removed context
lines, keeping the actual changed lines, and splitting composite
tokens (e.g., camel-case identifiers).
B. Results
We used 10-fold cross-validation to evaluate the predictive
performance of our models in terms of precision and recall,
and we compared them to the best results in the state of
the art. The outcome of our experiments is summarized in
Fig. 1, for the two models log message classifier (msg) and
patch classifier (patch) considered independently, as well as
for their combination (joint). The x-axis represents the weight
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Fig. 1: Evaluation results
wp assigned to the misclassification penalty for the positive
class (the negative class gets wn = 1− wp).
These plots illustrate clearly the trade-off between precision
and recall. Depending on the operating point (controlled by
adjusting the weights wp, wn), these models can be tuned to
obtain the desired level of precision, at the expense of lower
recall, or vice-versa.
The two left-most columns of the table below contain the
different performance figures reported by [3], when comparing
their approach with prior work or when describing the model
they deployed in production. For comparison, in the three
right-most columns we report the precision obtained with each
of our models (msg, patch, joint) for each level of recall fixed
in [3].
rec. prec. [3] prec. (msg) prec. (patch) prec. (joint)
0.50 0.51 0.58 0.71 0.74
0.72 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.57
0.76 0.34 0.39 0.45 0.56
As we explain in the next section, practical considerations
stemming from industrial practice make us emphasize preci-
sion rather than recall. The table below shows the recall figures
obtained when fixing precision at different levels equal to or
higher than 0.80.
prec. rec. (msg) rec. (patch) rec. (joint)
0.95 0.15 0.14 0.20
0.90 0.19 0.18 0.25
0.85 0.21 0.23 0.31
0.80 0.30 0.29 0.43
These figures show that, when tuning our models for high-
precision, we still obtain useful levels of recall, which makes
our approach suitable for real-world industrial use.
V. COMMIT CLASSIFICATION IN PRACTICE
We briefly discuss here two important aspects of practical
commit classification: the choice of reference performance
metrics, and the generalization of our approach to projects
written in languages other than Java.
The Importance of Precision. In an industrial scenario,
the security-relevant commits identified through automated
classification need to go through the manual assessment of
a human expert, who decides whether they should be added
to the corporate database of vulnerabilities that is used by
automated vulnerability scanners to check hundreds of projects
across the company. In this context, any approach that would
overwhelm the expert with too many false positives would be
unsustainable; in our experience, precision figures below 0.80
are impractical, because the number of commits analyzed daily
can quickly become unwieldy.
Cross-Language Application. While our approach is in-
herently (programming-)language independent, its predictive
performance could change when our model is applied to
projects written in programming languages other than the one
covered by the training data.
In an initial attempt to study this aspect, we analyzed
the 30 most recent vulnerabilities affecting Ruby projects
published on snyk.io at the time of writing. For five of the 30
vulnerabilities, we could not identify a corresponding commit.
On the other hand, some vulnerabilities are linked to multiple
commits, and some commits contain the same changes. As
a result, we obtained a dataset of 23 unique commits of
the “positive” class, from 15 distinct repositories. Using the
same technique as in Sec. IV-A, we derived a new validation
dataset (Snyk-Ruby in the following) containing 224 additional
“negative” samples (summing up to 247 commits).
We classified these commits with the joint predictor model
to that we had previously trained on Java-only data, which
resulted in a noticeable improvement of performance com-
pared to the result obtained in the cross-validation using the
SAP dataset. For comparison, on the Snyk-Ruby dataset we
obtained a precision of 82% with a recall of 61%, whereas
the best result we obtained on the SAP dataset (Java) was
80% precision and 43% recall. A similar result was reported
in [3], with a increase in performance when using a model
trained on Java to classify projects coded in Ruby or Go.
Based on our experience and some anecdotal evidence, we
believe that these differences in performance might depend on
the practices followed in different communities and even in
different projects: the information included in log messages
and the style of fixes (e.g., the amount and content of com-
ments included with security fixes) could make it substantially
easier (or harder) to classify them correctly.
While, of course, no generality can be claimed for the
results of this simple exercise, they suggest that the effect of
community-specific (and project-specific) practices on classi-
fication performance cannot be neglected. A systematic study
of this problem is in our plans for future research.
VI. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the need to support open-source vulnerability
management in an enterprise environment, we tackled the
problem of identifying security-relevant commits in source
code repositories using machine learning.
By translating the problem of classifying code changes to
the problem of classifying a document containing natural
language terms, we could apply classification models that
require no sophisticated code analysis and are agnostic of
the programming language. By combining relatively simple
models optimized for high precision, we obtained classification
capabilities that are suitable for industrial use. Our approach
outperforms state-of-the-art approaches [3], while employing
a computationally less expensive model and requiring a con-
siderably smaller training dataset.
We do believe that additional improvements are possible,
and that further research in model selection and optimization is
necessary. We expect more modern approaches (e.g., word em-
beddings, recurrent neural networks) to improve performance
even further and we plan to investigate their applicability.
A key conclusion of this work is that, as a consequence of
the naturalness of source code [5], even using basic NLP
methods and without recurring to sophisticated code-analysis
techniques, effective and relatively inexpensive commit clas-
sification can be achieved. A promising direction we are
exploring at the time of writing is the classification of a given
commit together with other resources (bug tracking tickets,
advisories, mailing list discussions) that link to it [8]. We will
report on our progress in this direction in a future paper.
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